Raleigh, NC, February 4, 2010 — The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) is set to consider two urgent recommendations that national fuel gas codes be changed to improve safety when gas pipes are being purged (cleared of air) during maintenance or installation of new piping.

The recommendations – to be voted on by board members at a CSB public meeting in Raleigh tonight – grow out of the CSB’s ongoing federal investigation into the June 9, 2009, natural gas explosion at the ConAgra Slim Jim production facility in Garner, North Carolina, which caused four deaths, three critical life-threatening burn injuries, and other injuries that sent a total of 67 people to the hospital.

In preliminary findings to be presented at a news conference this morning and at the public meeting tonight, CSB investigators determined that the catastrophic explosion resulted from the accumulation of significant amounts of natural gas that had been purged indoors from a new 120-foot length of pipe during the startup of a new water heater in the plant that made Slim Jims, a popular beef-jerky product. During pipe purging, workers feed pressurized gas into a pipe in order to displace air or other gases so that only pure fuel gas remains in the piping when it is connected to an appliance such as a water heater or boiler.

CSB Chairman John Bresland said, “The board is very concerned that companies across the country continue to purge pipes indoors, and this evening we will consider recommendations to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), the American Gas Association (AGA) and the International Code Council (ICC). Currently, the codes of the NFPA and ICC do not require gases to be vented outdoors or define adequate ventilation or hazardous conditions, nor do they require the use of combustible-gas detectors during these operations. The CSB recommendations, if adopted, would urge that these things be done.”

The NFPA and the ICC are prominent organizations whose codes are used and followed by government bodies, private organizations and individuals nationwide.

CSB investigations supervisor Donald Holmstrom said his team made the recommendations to the board during the course of the ConAgra investigation after discovering gaps in the fuel gas codes. “Purging flammable gases into building interiors is a recipe for disaster. At ConAgra, we determined the accident would not have happened had the gas been vented safely outdoors through a hose or pipe.” Mr. Holmstrom noted that since the June 2009 accident, ConAgra has instituted strict policies on purging, requiring it be done to safe outdoor locations.

As proposed, the CSB recommendations would urge the NFPA, the American Gas Association (AGA), and the ICC to enact tentative interim and then permanent changes to the National Fuel Gas Code. These would require that purged gases shall be vented “to a safe location outdoors, away from personnel and ignition sources.” In cases where outdoor venting is not possible, companies would be required to seek a variance from local officials before purging gas indoors, including approval of a risk evaluation and hazard control plan. The recommendation would also require the use of combustible gas detectors to continuously monitor gas concentrations; the training of personnel about the problems of odor fade and odor fatigue; and warnings against the use of odor alone for detecting releases of fuel gases. 

The CSB issued a safety bulletin in October 2009 entitled “Dangers of Purging Gas Piping into Buildings.” The bulletin’s key lesson is: “Purging new or existing gas piping into a building can be highly hazardous due to the possible accumulation of gas … and the associated danger of fire and explosion.” It notes that large numbers of workers are at risk, including plumbers, gas installers, maintenance workers, contract supervisors, and industrial facility managers.

Mr. Holmstrom said, “The CSB has examined several other similar accidents in which gas was purged indoors and not detected.  We have determined that workers cannot rely on their sense of smell to warn them of danger, in part because people become desensitized to the odorant added to natural gas and propane. Gas detectors must be used.”�

Other incidents examined by the CSB include: a 1999 explosion at a Ford power plant in Dearborn, Michigan, killing six, injuring 38, and causing a $1 billion property loss; a 2008 explosion at a Hilton Hotel under construction in San Diego, California that injured fourteen people; a 2005 school explosion in Porterville, California, burning two plumbers; and an explosion at a hotel in Cheyenne, Wyoming, in 2007 severely burning two plumbers.

In addition to Chairman Bresland, the board consists of William E. Wright and William B. Wark. There are currently two board vacancies. Approval of recommendations requires a majority vote. The CSB meeting will be held at the Sheraton Raleigh Hotel, 421 South Salisbury Street.

Following a presentation of preliminary findings by the investigation team, the board will receive the views from a panel of experts: Chris Noles of the North Carolina State Fire Marshal’s Office (the state has passed strict regulations to require outdoor gas purging since the accident), Ted Lemoff of the National Fire Protection Association, and Belinda Thielen of the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, which represents employees at the ConAgra Slim Jim plant.

Finally, the board will hear from members of the public who wish to speak. “This was a devastating accident,” Chairman Bresland said, “and it is my hope that workers and residents in the area will let us know their views on the need for the stricter codes that we will be considering on Thursday evening.”

The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. The agency’s board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems.

The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA. Visit our website, www.csb.gov.

For more information, contact Director of Public Affairs Dr. Daniel Horowitz, 202-441-6074 cell, or Hillary Cohen, 202-446-8094 cell.

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Federal OSHA issued three Mueller Industries Inc. subsidiaries in Fulton Mississippi 128 citations for allegedly exposing workers to safety and health hazards. The privately-held corporation headquartered in Memphis, Tenn., owns and operates 20 facilities located in eight states and two foreign countries.

OSHA began its investigation in July 2009 after a maintenance worker employed by Mueller Copper Tube Co. Inc., a subsidiary of Mueller Industries, was killed, and two other workers were injured when naphtha, a flammable liquid of hydrocarbon mixtures, leaked from an electric pump and ignited.

“Mueller Industries subsidiaries’ dangerous practices exposed workers at their facilities to a variety of hazards that ultimately took one worker’s life,” said Assistant Secretary of Labor for OSHA Dr. David Michaels. “The significant fines of $683,000 cannot replace this worker’s life or bring peace to the family, but they will go a long way in letting this employer know disregarding worker safety and health will not be tolerated.”

Mueller Copper Tube has been issued willful, repeat and serious citations. A willful citation with a penalty of $40,000 alleges the failure to repair a corroded live electrical disconnect, which exposed workers to electrical shock. Ten repeat citations with penalties of $150,000 allege failure to guard machinery; unsafe electrical equipment and practices; and failure to label hazardous chemicals. Sixty-nine serious citations, with proposed penalties of $223,500, allege unsafe cranes; fall hazards; unsafe ladders; blocked and inadequate exits; unsafe flammable liquid and compressed gas use and storage; locking out hazardous energy sources during maintenance and service; a lack of machine guards; unsafe electrical equipment and practices; and failure to establish a respiratory protection program.

The initial safety inspection at Mueller Cooper Tube was expanded to include Mueller Fittings LLC and Mueller Packaging LLC, two additional subsidiaries of Mueller Industries. Mueller Fittings has been issued 22 serious citations, with penalties of $64,000, alleging the failure to lock out energy sources, unsafe propane storage and handling, overexposure to noise, unsafe material storage, and the likelihood of exposure to bloodborne pathogens. Eight repeat citations also have been issued, with penalties of $102,500, alleging a lack of machine guarding, electrical hazards and the inadequate labeling of hazardous chemicals.

Mueller Packaging has been issued 12 serious citations, with penalties of $28,000, alleging unsafe crane operation, failing to lock out sources of hazardous energy, hazardous chemical exposures, and overexposure to noise; five repeat citations, with penalties of $75,000, alleging an unsafe forklift modification, electrical hazards and inadequate labeling under the hazard communication standard; and one other-than-serious violation, with no penalty, for an electrical deficiency.

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OSHA issued CES Environmental Services Inc. 15 willful and 54 serious citations after an investigation into a fatal explosion at the company’s Griggs Road facility in Houston Texas. Proposed penalties total $1,477,500.In July 2009, an employee cleaning a tank was killed in an explosion when an altered piece of equipment ignited flammable vapors inside the tank. The fatality was the third death in less than a year at this employer’s facilities; two hydrogen sulfide exposure-related deaths at a related facility, Port Arthur Chemical & Environmental Services LLC (PACES), occurred in December 2008 and April 2009.

“Proper precaution prevents deaths,” said Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis. “Employers should take steps to eliminate hazards and provide a safe working environment for their workers. That is the law.”

Based on the most recent investigation, OSHA has issued 15 willful citations with proposed penalties totaling $1,050,000, alleging that 15 pieces of electrical equipment were unsafe to use in the tank wash area due to the presence of flammable and combustible vapors. Two additional willful citations with proposed penalties totaling $125,000 have been issued. One alleges that CES failed to ventilate tanks in which employees were working, exposing the workers to toxic atmospheric hazards. The other alleges that CES stored flammable and reactive chemicals together, which posed fire and explosion hazards.

In addition, OSHA has issued 54 serious violations with proposed penalties totaling $302,500. These include allegations that CES failed to implement all aspects of the process safety management standard; provide proper respiratory protection, confined space rescue equipment and adequate fall protection; properly install and maintain boiler equipment; implement an emergency response plan, and adequate energy control procedures; train powered industrial truck operators; guard and to anchor machinery adequately; store compressed gas cylinders safely; and label hazardous chemicals.

OSHA previously cited PACES following the Dec.18, 2008 and the April 14, 2009, fatalities and proposed penalties of $16,600 and $207,800, respectively. Both of those fatalities occurred in Port Arthur, Texas. Those citations were contested and are being litigated before the independent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. CES and PACES together employ 155 workers.

See related Articles:
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/hotstories/6798145.html

http://ohsonline.com/articles/2010/01/04/osha-sends-message-with-filing.aspx?admgarea=news
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How long can you store your oxygen and acetylene cylinders on a welding cart or “special truck” before you must disconnect them from the regulator, cap, secure, and store according to OSHA requirements? 

Do the requirements differ if you are at a construction site versus general industry? 

The General Industry and Construction Standards only specify the requirements for storage and use, but not how long it sits idle before it’s considered in “storage”.  Twenty-four hours of inactivity is the answer that I frequently hear.  But is this assumption correct? 

What about the wear and tear on the regulator and tank threads by removing them from tanks so frequently?  Doesn’t this create a greater hazard?  What about the hazard of transporting the tanks so frequently?  Moving these cylinders is a hazard in itself? 

OSHA has issued several Standard Interpretations related to this subject under 1910.253 General Industry and 1926.350 Construction.  In the Construction Standard, OHSA has interpreted that cylinders must be placed into storage when it is reasonably anticipated that gas will not be drawn from the cylinder within 24 hours.  In General Industry however, the frequency at which the cylinders are used is not the main consideration for determining storage versus use.  The language of the General Industry standard requires using the storage regulations when the cylinders are not in use or connected to use.  OSHA attempts to “harmonize” the two requirements by stating that failure to comply with the storage requirements under either the General Industry or Construction Standard would be considered de minimis regardless of the period of time in which the cylinders are on the cart if the following parameters are met:

1. No more than a single acetylene cylinder and a single oxygen cylinder are on a cylinder cart. The cylinder cart must be specifically designed to hold/carry oxygen and acetylene cylinders in the upright position. The cylinders must be securely held to the cart (such as by straps, chains or other securing device).
2. The cart is on a firm, level surface.
3. The cart is not in an area where there is a reasonably foreseeable risk of being struck by vehicles, equipment, or materials (such as in a pathway for vehicles on a construction site).
4. Both cylinders either have valves closed with protection caps on or are connected to a properly functioning regulator.

For more information guidelines on this subject refer to the 1926.350 and 1910.253 standards and the Standard Interpretations below.

http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=25356

http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22674

http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=25371

http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21261

Your Propane Cylinder May Have Been Used in a Meth Lab!

It has come to the attention of the National Propane Gas Association that propane cylinders are being used in the manufacturing of methamphetamines. This drug is commonly referred to as “crank”. Manufacturers of this illegal substance are using propane cylinders for the storage and the use of anhydrous ammonia. These cylinders have been found in many states at cylinder exchange and refilling locations as well as in hotel rooms and mobile laboratories, where the manufacturing of this illegal substance takes place.

A blue-green stain on any brass portion of a service valve is evidence that it may have been in contact with anhydrous ammonia. The pungent odor of ammonia on or near the cylinder is also an indication. If you suspect that a propane cylinder contains or has contained anhydrous ammonia, exercise extreme caution and restrict access to the area.  For more information go to the National Propane Gas Association Safety Bulletin.